Israel’s military admits failures on Oct. 7. Its probe of the assault may put strain on Netanyahu
TEL AVIV, Israel — An investigation by the Israeli navy has decided that Hamas was in a position to perform the deadliest assault in Israeli historical past on Oct. 7, 2023, as a result of the rather more highly effective Israeli military misjudged the militant group’s intentions and underestimated its capabilities.
The findings, launched Thursday, may strain Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to launch a extensively demanded broader inquiry to look at the political decision-making that preceded the assault, which triggered the battle in Gaza.
Many Israelis consider the errors of Oct. 7 prolong past the navy, they usually blame Netanyahu for what they view as a failed technique of deterrence and containment within the years main as much as the assault. That technique included permitting Qatar to ship suitcases of money into Gaza and sidelining Hamas’ rival, the internationally acknowledged Palestinian Authority.
The prime minister has not taken duty, saying he’ll reply powerful questions solely after the battle, which has been paused for almost six weeks by a tenuous ceasefire. Regardless of public strain, together with from the households of the roughly 1,200 folks killed within the Oct. 7 assault and the 251 taken as hostages into Gaza, Netanyahu has resisted requires a fee of inquiry.
The navy’s fundamental findings had been that the area’s strongest and complicated navy misinterpret Hamas’ intentions, underestimated its capabilities and was wholly unprepared for the shock assault by 1000’s of closely armed militants within the early morning hours of a significant Jewish vacation.
The navy’s findings are consistent with previous conclusions reached by officers and analysts. The navy launched solely a abstract of the report and navy officers outlined its findings.
“Oct. 7 was an entire failure,” stated one navy official, who spoke on situation of anonymity consistent with laws.
A central false impression was that Hamas, which seized management of Gaza from the Palestinian Authority in 2007, was extra concerned with governing the territory than preventing Israel, the inquiry discovered.
The navy additionally misjudged the militant group’s capabilities. Navy planners had envisioned that, at worst, Hamas may stage a floor invasion from as much as eight border factors, the official stated. In truth, Hamas had greater than 60 assault routes.
Intelligence assessed within the aftermath of the assault has proven Hamas got here near staging the offensive on three earlier events however delayed it for unknown causes, the official stated.
The official stated that within the hours earlier than the assault, there have been indicators that one thing was amiss, together with when Hamas fighters switched their telephones over to the Israeli community.
The notion that Hamas didn’t need battle guided determination makers away from taking motion which may have thwarted the assault. The Israeli navy official stated intelligence reveals that Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the Oct. 7 assault who was killed final October, had begun planning it as early as 2017.
With the navy off guard on a vacation weekend, Hamas launched a heavy wave of rockets that allowed 1000’s of fighters to burst by means of the safety fence or fly over it on hold gliders. They knocked out surveillance cameras and rapidly overwhelmed a whole lot of troopers stationed alongside the border.
From there they superior to key freeway intersections and attacked troops dispatched to the world, together with some senior officers, disrupting the navy’s command and management, in keeping with a second navy official, who additionally spoke on situation of anonymity.
For the primary three hours after the assault, Hamas fighters marauded by means of border communities and a music pageant with little resistance. That was when many of the 251 hostages had been taken and most of the people had been killed, the official stated. The official stated the chaos led to pleasant hearth incidents, though he stated there weren’t many, with out disclosing a determine.
It took hours for the navy to regain management and days till the world was absolutely cleared of militants.
Based on the primary official, the report blamed the navy for being overconfident in its data and never displaying sufficient doubt in its core ideas and beliefs. It didn’t place blame on any particular person troopers or officers, however is prone to pave the way in which for a reckoning within the navy and eventual dismissals.
Some high-ranking officers have already resigned, together with the previous head of navy intelligence and Israel’s prime common, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, who steps down subsequent week.
